By Murat Yeşiltaş

 There is a widely held belief that Turkish foreign policy is currently undergoing a significant shift. Particularly in the aftermath of the presidential elections on May, a noticeable process has unfolded wherein Türkiye has been actively working to mend its relationships with Europe.

This has manifested in the reinvigoration of its strategic pursuit of the European Union (EU) membership and a more determined effort to address existing issues with the United States. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s endorsement of Sweden’s NATO membership during the Vilnius NATO summit, the resumption of talks with Greece, and a moderated tone in dealings with European counterparts have all been interpreted as signs of a changing foreign policy stance.

Conversely, President Erdoğan’s engagement with the Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, signaling a strategic reorientation toward Türkiye-Egypt relations, and his willingness to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, despite domestic challenges faced by the latter, have stood out as striking examples of this policy shift. Moreover, Erdoğan’s recent tour of the Gulf region has solidified the perception that this change is lasting.

The transition from normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to concrete economic and defense partnerships in key sectors challenges the notion of merely normalized relations with the Gulf states.

Amid these post-election developments, there has also been speculation concerning a recalibration of Türkiye-Russia relations, often interpreted as a return to Türkiye’s traditional diplomatic approach.

Behind all these evaluations, it is claimed that the economic difficulties that Türkiye is going through are the driving factors and that this innovation is not a strategic choice but a strategic necessity. Contrary to the claims that there is a foreign policy change based on economic difficulties, we can argue that the change in Turkish foreign policy is neither a strategic necessity nor a strategic choice. On the contrary, Turkish foreign policy has been reformulated more assertively. It is concluded that this change will return to the traditional foreign policy in which Türkiye-Western relations will be placed at the center of foreign policy and Turkish-Russian relations will be placed on a more competitive cooperation axis.

When it comes to the Middle East, it is claimed that there has been a return to a collaborative approach.

New visions fuel bolder foreign policy
While accepting that foreign policy has changed, it becomes evident that Türkiye is actively seeking a more assertive role within the global landscape. Three key dynamics underscore this pursuit. First, the current uncertainty within the international system presents opportunities for countries like Türkiye, which, although traditionally regarded as a regional power, now possesses the potential to function as a substantial global actor.

President Erdoğan’s assertion of Türkiye’s effectiveness extends beyond regional boundaries, marking it as an influential participant in great power competition, capable of playing a balancing role, setting agendas, propounding transformative narratives, and maintaining a global foreign policy agenda. President Erdoğan sees the uncertainty and transition period in the international system as an opportunity for Türkiye to pursue a more assertive foreign policy.

Conceptual interventions such as the “Century of Türkiye” and the “Axis of Türkiye” are very important to demonstrate this motivation. On the other hand, Hakan Fidan, the newly appointed foreign minister, has a portfolio and vision that can carry the claim that Erdoğan wants.

At this point, it is necessary to underline the foreign policy targets that Fidan set at the 14th Ambassadors Conference. Fidan says that Turkish foreign policy has four goals. The first goal is to reduce conflicts to establish peace and security in the region (Middle East, North Africa, Caucasus, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, etc.). The second goal is to put foreign relations on a more structural and institutional basis. The third goal is to improve the welfare environment and the final objective is to relocate Türkiye as a global actor to contribute to international peace and security. In this context, Türkiye’s primary goals are to put Asian, Latin American, and African partnerships back on a more permanent and institutional basis and to intensify efforts to reform the international system.

Secondly, Türkiye’s strategic environment plays a pivotal role in shaping its foreign and security policy recalibration. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, for instance, exerts multifaceted pressures on Turkish foreign policy, impacting issues ranging from Türkiye-NATO relations and Turkish-Russian relations to Black Sea security concerns.

 The uncertain Syrian situation similarly shapes Türkiye’s strategic imperatives, directly impacting its national security and other strategic interests. When other regional problems are taken into account, Türkiye’s geopolitical environment is mainly shaped by security problems. Despite all these problems, Türkiye sees the restrictive strategic environment caused by the geopolitical developments as a springboard to implement Erdoğan’s grand foreign policy vision and to consolidate Türkiye’s global actorness.

Domestic politics
The last dynamic is directly related to domestic politics. The foreign and domestic policy nexus is an integral part of Erdoğan’s foreign policy doctrine. It provides President Erdoğan to establish a discursive dominance over his domestic rivals, allows him to keep his electoral base alive, and enables him to make strategic surprises against his foreign rivals at any time in practical foreign policy developments.

Erdoğan move to bring up Türkiye’s EU membership as a counterargument in response to Sweden’s NATO membership, right before the NATO Vilnius Summit, stands as a noteworthy example that closely corresponds with the principles laid out in the Erdoğan Doctrine. More importantly, foreign policy is an integral part of President Erdoğan’s policy of economic growth when it comes to foreign and domestic policy nexus.

In this new phase, a proactive Turkish foreign policy is unfolding, a blend of Erdoğan’s doctrine and the foreign policy vision of Fidan. As Erdoğan spearheads foreign policy with his aspirations for Türkiye’s global role, assertiveness, strategic pragmatism, and economic focus; Fidan acts as the executor, leveraging his experience in foreign and security files, extensive knowledge, and popularity. This collaborative approach positions Türkiye to bolster its burgeoning power profile.

The fundamental shift in Turkish foreign policy is marked by a transition from adversarial strategies to cooperative ones, signifying a forward-looking orientation rather than one rooted in the past.

Assoc. Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş; earned his PhD at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Marmara University in 2012 with the thesis titled “Locating Turkey: Geopolitical Mentality and the Army in Turkey.” He also holds the position of director of security studies at SETA Foundation, Ankara, Turkey.