MIRS-  Hemn Hussein Wali

On November 24, the white House declared that Mr. Trump informed Erdogan about ‘Pending Adjustments to the military support provided to our partners on the ground in Syria’. Interestingly, it also mentioned the expression: ‘consistent with our previous policy’.[1] The worry in this early introduction is not about what it means exactly, but it is about the intensive U.S concern as to the Turkey’s worries. It appears like to say: Dear Erdogan, please keep quiet; it is all about to be done!

However, it may be according to the conviction of an afar Syrian’s event observer that the theater is going to display its last scene by gradual land stripping of ISIS. While the reality is that the only key change of the post-ISIS, forms nothing apart from removal of the first defeated contestant in a multi-player game. If you struggle to remember the actual distributional map of the Syrian territory among different fighting groups in 2014, you may be missed into the overlapping changes that have occurred since then. The most precise expression for the period that passed, it might not be more than a ‘Chaos’. While now the mirror appears to wipe away her face leaving only the basic spots: Kurds in the northern east, the regime is almost everywhere except for the towns and cities controlled by the various opposition groups that are almost besieged. Thus the gestures of a new phase of conflict seem push the main post-ISIS powers into clash.

 The Syrian officials recently are hinting at the unity and liberation of the entire Syrian soil which angered by the crucial win of SDF in the AL-Omer Oil field controlling contest. Turkey repeatedly states that it will never accept an autonomous administration ruled by YPG (the most powerful Kurdish Group within SDF) in the northern Syria. Moreover, through seemingly an intensive latent discussion between U.S and Turkey, an attack over the Efrin canton is demanded by the last one. The key question hereinafter followed is: whether in the case of a foreseeable confrontation between SDF and either Turkey or Syria, how will U.S react? Is a vulnerable Kurdish ‘de facto’ in the northern east of Syria strategically protected? Whether U.S ever holds any responsibility toward them rather than temporary military task? 

The start of the U.S & SDF Cooperation

Obama administration in 2013, permitted the Covert CIA Program for training and  weapon supplying  the ‘Moderate Syrian Rebels’  aiming either to dislodge Asad regime or at least  push him to attend a constructive negotiation table.  None of these aims has achieved. Reversely, it was claimed that the majority of the weapons leaked to the extremists among them ISIS.[2] The program formally remained valid, whereas on the ground the U.S weapon supply halted ending with uncertainties. The turning point was the inclusion of the SDF in the program by September 2016.[3] However, from late 2015 on, U.S occasionally provided them weapons.[4] U.S was lacked a real secular and active partner on the ground, hence the both sides were in a critical need for each other. U.S exercising its leverage through a capable domestic power, while SDF (dominated by YPG, whereas including Arab, Turkmen and Christians) obtained the necessary weapons and equipments required in fighting ISIS.

 In January 31, 2017, SDF received armored vehicles and military equipment[5], which by July 2017, 400 armored vehicles delivered and 4000 fighters were trained, in additional to the continuous air support.  Consequently, U.S achieved what it ever wanted: fighting terrorism in the region effectively without direct involvement through U.S troop deployment.[6] The war is going on well liberating nearly the most Syrian territories located east of Euphrates, including Raqqa the alleged Capital of the ISIS collapsed ‘state’ in Syria.

Trump administration policy in the Syria

Trump’s view on Russia generally is softer and friendlier than Obama administration. He several times proposed forming a cooperative and common effort in fighting terrorism.  According to a report from CNN Trump argued that: “I have always felt that Russia and the United States should be able to work well with each other towards defeating terrorism and restoring world peace, not to mention trade and all of the other benefits derived from mutual respect.”[7] It appears that Trump does not consider Russia as the “traditional enemy” which American mind has used to. Accordingly, the respect for the Russian interests in Syria by Trump administration seems quite clear, either by avoiding any possibility of confrontation or giving up  the Obama's explicit negative attitude toward remaining of Asad in the future Syria. Currently, U.S is reluctant and inconclusive regarding transitional period for Syria without Assad.[8]

 It is believed that Trump’s scraping of the Covert CIA program 2013, spouts mainly from the fact that he does not have any serious concern in dislodging Assad satisfying Russia. Thus, the reality on the ground shows that the current administration’s strategy in Syria is correlated with the U.S common Middle East priority in fighting terrorism. This argument broadly supported by the Trump’s statement literally in this September concerning their role in the conflict in Syria: the US has very little to do with Syria other than killing IS’.[9] However, as to the US policy regarding Iran and the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah in Syria remains thoroughly ambiguous, since they are in a continuous advance and expand, while U.S in a static position of watching.

Consequence of the Relation between US and SDF after ISIS

The significant territorial expansion by SDF, (Almost entire east of Euphrates, Minbj and Efrin Canton) as much as increases its geopolitical leverage, increases the seriousness of the regional threats as well. Nearly 50% of the area is a non-Kurd populated. In the time that I am writing this Article Turkey has commenced a periodical shelling over Efrin, SDF responding with shelling Adlib. Turkey recently expressed its plain desire for unconditional talk with the Syrian Regime except targeting Rojava. Even the opposition groups oppose the Rojava as much as they oppose Syrian Regime. Balancing the Rojava’s heterogeneous Ethno-Religious population, will be an additional severe task as well.

 The key question is how could U.S react in case if Rojava attacked by Turkey or Syrian Regime after elimination of ISIS?  In other words, what is the nature of the relation between SDF and US? Is it strategic or mere temporary military task?

In addition to the Trump’s statement: ‘the US has little to do with Syria other than killing IS’, US secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis pressing on May 19, 2017: “The U.S has so far limited its relations with Syrian Kurds at military level, though the main-Kurdish administration has shown willingness to develop political diplomatic ties with the United States”. Also, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Jonathan Cohen declared that:  “the nature of the united states’ partnership with the YPG is temporary, transactional and tactical”.[10] “That is not our plan, our intent is to defeat ISIS and we’re keeping our focus on that,” That was what Heather Nauert, U.S. State Department Spokeswoman plainly said responding a question on whether the U.S. would stay in northern Syria, in August 18, 2017. Nauert in another occasion said: the main goal and the intent of the United States and Coalition partners is to defeat ISIS militants in Syria and Iraq. “We want Syria governed by Syrians, not by the United States, not by any other forces, but by Syrians”.[11]

Previously, once SDF crossed Euphrates heading and aiming to connect with Efrin Canton, though the passage was controlled by ISIS, whereas under a hysteric Turkey objection, U.S had not consented over the operation. However, SDF conducted the operation by controlling Manbj heading west.  Turkish army accompanied by several pro-Turkey Syrian opposition groups launched ‘Euphrates Shield’, cutting off the passage that was supposed that SDF’s operation cross through. The Euphrates Shield eliminated the Kurdish dream in a dramatic and sorrowful way. Turkey by no mean had the right for conducting such an operation, yet U.S had already permitted the Turkish operation.[12] The U.S attitude could be understood within two points: First, it neutralized the extreme fury of a NATO-member by providing a limited but strategic role in Syria. Second,  the Turkey operation was supposed to push back SDF to the east of Euphrates, while U.S let SDF to remain in  the pre-'Euphrates shield' controlled areas in the west Euphrates, despite U.S had already warned SDF that they lose the U.S support in case crossing Euphrates. Accordingly, the balance between recent military partner and strategic traditional partner was preserved. This was during the ISIS fighting, as U.S makes its intention in the relation with SDF clear merely concerning common enemy: ISIS, what could U.S provide for the ROjava’s foreseeable problems Post-ISIS?

The surrounded states despite their disputes are keen for undermining the Rojava project.  What if Syrian regime repeated the Aleppo scenario against Rojava assisting by the effective Iranian and Russian weapons and airstrikes? What if Turkey initiated second Euphrates Shield’? Will U.S be ready to confront Russia which it previously chose to not do it in a more critical time? Will U.S confront Turkey which It previouslly did not do it crucially even during it’s sever need for SDF in fighting ISIS??

Unfortunately,  U.S periodically made it clear that U.S presence in Syria is basically for Fighting ISIS, it supports a decisive unity for Syria, its Relation with SDF a mere military common  task, it will leave Syria after ISIS for Syrian themselves.[13] Currently, U.S patently declares that the weapon supply for SDF as limited as the capacity of ISIS. Furthermore, the U.S administration seems quite enthusiastic in informing such a development to the Turkey.[14] Thus, when U.S performs its military task against its direct enemy (ISIS) by a proxy, hardly could be anticipated in a direct involvement when a tension raises between Syrian and Turkey vs. SDF. It may not only be about the U.S’s desire to weaken SDF, as it was not US’ willingness to destroy Aleppo, rather  it is about the U.S limited leverage within the Syrian conflict as well.

Nevertheless, all what has analyzed until this point relay on the current valid U.S policy in Syria. Hopefully, the fertile environment for terrorism in the region may motivate U.S in reconsidering its policy and its future relation with Rojava. Since it will be a quite tricky task for U.S to find another such a well disciplined, adherent, active and secular partner in a already sectarian dominated region. But ultimately the Henry Kissinger’s famous message should permanently be bear in Kurdish mind: ‘“Promise them anything, give them what they get, and fuck them if they can’t take a joke”.[15]

References

Chase Winter, “Donald Trump scraps Covert CIA Program to arm Syrian Rebels,” DW, July 20, 2017.          

"US sending arms to Kurdish-led SDF in Syria, Turkey's Erdogan outraged". ARA News, 25 September 2016.

Roy Gutman, "U.S. begins airdrops of weapons to Kurdish forces in northern Syria", McClatchy, 12 October 2015, 

Carla Babb, “US supplies First armored vehicles to the Syrian fighters,”  Voanews, Feb 1,2017,

Alexander Pearson, “What do the US, Russia, Turkey and Iran want?” DW, November 2,2017,

Elena Ulansky and William Witenberg, “The evolution of Trump’s View on Russia,” Hufington Post,   

Paul Iddon, “The United States’ Relation with Rojava after ISIS,” Rudaw, May 20,2017,

Heather Nauert, “Department press briefing” U.S Department of States, Augest 18,2017:

 “IS conflict: Turkey-backed Syrian rebels take Jarablus,” BBC, Augest 24, 2016:

James S. Brady, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders,” The White House, November 27, 2017,

Mickey Z, “Kissinger to Kurds: F*ck ‘em if they can’t take a joke!” World News Trust, December 2, 2016,

[1] Office of the Press Secretary, white House, ‘Readout of President Donald J .Trump’s Call with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey’, November 24, 2017

[2] Chase Winter, “Donald Trump scraps Covert CIA Program to arm Syrian Rebels,” DW, July 20,2017,            http://www.dw.com/en/donald-trump-scraps-covert-cia-program-to-arm-syrian-rebels/a-39763349

[3] "US sending arms to Kurdish-led SDF in Syria, Turkey's Erdogan outraged". ARA News, 25 September 2016. http://aranews.net/2016/09/us-sending-arms-kurdish-led-sdf-syria-turkeys-erdogan-outraged/

[4] Roy Gutman, "U.S. begins airdrops of weapons to Kurdish forces in northern Syria", McClatchy, 12 October 2015,  https://web.archive.org/web/20151013115202/http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/middle-east/article38868126.html

[5] Carla Babb, “US supplies First armored vehicles to the Syrian fighters,”  Voanews, Feb 1,2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-provides-syrian-democratic-forces-with-guardian-armored-vehicles/3702817.html

[6] Alexander Pearson, “What do the US, Russia, Turkey and Iran want?” DW, November 2,2017,

http://www.dw.com/en/syria-conflict-what-do-the-us-russia-turkey-and-iran-want/a-41211604

[7]  Elena Ulansky and William Witenberg, “The evolution of Trump’s View on Russia,” Hufington Post,     https://www.huffingtonpost.com/elena-ulansky/the-evolution-of-trumps-v_b_9964094.html

[8] Pearson (n 5).

[9] Pearson (n 5)

[10] Paul Iddon, “The United States’ Relation with Rojava after ISIS,” Rudaw, May 20,2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/20052017

[11] Heather Nauert, “Department press briefing” U.S Department of States, Augest 18,2017: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/08/273533.htm

[12] “IS conflict: Turkey-backed Syrian rebels take Jarablus,” BBC, Augest 24, 2016:

 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37171995

13]James S. Brady, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders,” The White House, November 27, 2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/11/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-11272017-35

[14] Brady (n 12)

[15] Mickey Z, “Kissinger to Kurds: F*ck ‘em if they can’t take a joke!” World News Trust, December 2, 2016,

http://worldnewstrust.com/kissinger-to-kurds-f-ck-em-if-they-can-t-take-a-joke-mickey-z