On the 18^th of this month, the Trump administration published its vision regarding the U.S.’s national security strategy in the Middle East. In this strategic vision nearly one page and a half (680 words) has allocated for the Middle East’s affairs. Principally, three interesting and new points could be noticed: first, expansion and progress of the Iranian’s hegemony in the region, Second; appearance of new partnerships (Saudi-Israeli) dissimilar to the traditional ones, third; additional U.S. supports to the allies attempting restoration of the regional balance and stability. 

Generally, the U.S.’s strategic vision as to the Middle East is presented as the following: ‘The United States seeks a Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile ( Iran is intended here) to the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy market’.

According to the Trump administration’s perspective, the genuine problems of Middle East’s are as stated below:

·    Expansion of the Iranian regional hegemony.

·    Existence of the Jihadist terrorism

·    Collapse and weakness of the states

·    Regional rivalries between states

·    Socio-Economic recession 

Thus the following cases will be taken into consideration while implementing the strategy in the Middle East: first,  ‘a strong and integrated Gulf Cooperation Council’, second; strengthening  a ‘long-term strategic partnership with Iraq as an independent state’, third; ‘settlement to the Syrian civil war’, Fourth; cooperation with allies for preventing Iran from gaining  a nuclear weapon and limitation of the Iranian hegemony, Fifth;  assisting  a broad peace agreement that is satisfactory to both Israelis and Palestinians.

The Trump administration enthusiastically discusses how the regional nations were considering the Israel-Palestine conflict as the main reason for the regional instability and stagnation. But currently due to the Jihadist and Iranian threats, it has been clear that the genuine factor for the instabilities is not Israel. Additionally, it clarifies how the regional states increasingly find common interests between them and Israel, and they wish to counter these common threats jointly. Apparently, in the last point, it means the recent rapprochement between the Saudi kingdom and United Arabic Emirates with Israel because of the increasing Iranian threat and influence in the region.                                

What is quite interesting in this strategic vision, Iran is addressed very straight and intensively. Within nearly 680 allocated words for the Middle East, the malicious Iranian behavior is addressed directly by 130 words, and indirectly in many other places. Iran is mentioned seven times, and the terror word is also stated seven times. What is once again interesting is that for the indication to the Sunni terrorism (ISIS and Al-Qaeda) the phrase of Jihadist terror has been used, it means whenever the term terror is freely stated, it includes Iranian terrorism as well.

Iran is indicated as the ‘world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism’, and it implements its vicious activities on the three levels: first, supplying weapons to the Iranian proxies who destabilize the region on behalf of the Iran and also funding them, Second; development of its ballistic missile capacities and terrible intelligence activities, Third; conducting malicious cyber actions. In general, Iran in the most paragraphs of the Vision is mentioned as a dangerous state that should be stopped and blocked. Actually, compared with the last Obama administration’s strategic vision regarding Middle East in 2015, the Trump Administration intends to restrict the Iranian influence over the Region. In the Obama Strategic vision, Iran has only been indicated to twice, and it was within an optimistic attempt to reach an agreement over its nuclear program. In the entire Obama strategic vision to the Middle East neither time Iran has been mentioned in a hostile framework.

Despite such an intensive focus on the expansion of the Iranian hegemony and its terrorist role in the destabilization of the region, while no urgent and practical mechanism is provided for its confrontation. The Trump administration believes that original reason for the Iranian increasing influence is the weakness and collapse of the regional states.  It means Iran has taken advantage from the instability for unbalancing the regional power for its favor. Thus the only mechanism that is presented in the strategic vision is the restoration of the stability from re-balancing regional powers and empowering the allies.

U.S. has proposed that for re-establishment of the regional balance and stability, it needs to strengthen the current partnerships and also build new ones (the Gulf-Israel is intended in the last one). In addition, it offers generous economic and political supports to the allied states in achieving their prosperity and advanced military capacity. Dependently, the Saudi and Egypt reform project is strongly supported, and any effort in building and strengthening the missile and counter-terrorism capacities will be assisted by U.S.

In fact, the U.S. proposed mechanism for confronting Iran and Jihadist seems a long-term and lasting one. While from the Lebanon and Syria crossing the Iraq to Yemen, Iran increasingly strengthens its existences. Thus, it appears that the Gulf’s optimistic expectancy for an urgent U.S military process for attacking Iran may not be quite accurate. 

Accordingly, the question that should now be asked is; whether the Influenced Arabic states, namely; Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and even Bahrain (they demographically have a heterogeneous communities and Shia forms a genuine part of them) are able to re-strengthen themselves in such a dramatic manner that U.S desires? How will these states get rid of the current Iranian Shiite dominance without U.S military involvement, while Sunnis are in their weakest position? How they turn to net pro-American states so as to deserve the economic and political U.S supports? Actually these questions’ fate should be determined prior to the enforcement of any real project in confronting Iranian influence.

As to the impacts of this strategic vision on the Kurds, it should be clear that Iraq is the most important or the entrance in the face of the Iranian hegemony. The Trump administration will certainly not leave the Iraq for the net Iranian dominance. That is why; it expresses an intention for strengthening a long-term strategic partnership with an ‘independent’ Iraq. For that, it needs the Kurds, but inside the Iraq not out of it. U.S. supports the Kurd’s presence in Baghdad, while it is not for the planned empowerment of the Kurdistan region, but it is for reforming a more diverse and strong Bagdad and moving it further away from Iran.